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Abstract 
War is a major determinant in both the rise of the welfare state and the 
implementation of welfare services. Progressive and social control 
perspectives are used as a framework for analyzing the impact-of war on 
welfare state policy formulation. Progressive theorists link the formation of 
the welfare state to the social solidarity created by war: guns leads to 
butter. The social control theorists maintain that the need for healthy 
soldiers leads to welfare, guns elicit butter, or that both warfare and 
welfare are designed to control the poor: guns and butter are aimed at 
maintaining domestic social order among the lower classes. Both perspectives 
are criticized and the limitations of viewing war as the major causal variable 
in the rise of the welfare state are assessed. 
Introduction 
The welfare state, at the time of this writing, is under attack from the 
Reagan Administration. This is reflected in the severe cutbacks in welfare 
services since Reagan has assumed office. By the middle of 1981 Congress had 
approved cuts of more than $130 billion for the years 1982-1984.1 In 1985 
wen more severe cutbacks are being planned due to the large federal deficit. 
The thrust of this attack is aimed at income maintenance programs. Many of 
these programs are intended for the very poor. But, even such sacrosanct 
programs as social security may not be immune from federal cutbacks: at the 
very least it appears that the scope of social security will be reduced. In 
short, many welfare state programs that have grown since the Great Depression 
are in the process of being dismantled.= 
Guns or Butter? 
Although there have been differing interpretations of the value and 
meaning of these cutbacks, conservatives, liberals, and radicals agree on one 
point: the massive reduction in welfare services have been accompanied by 
dramatic increases in defense spending. Indeed, this conforms to the 
conventional wisdom that there is always a tradeoff between guns and butter. 
Because of this, the traditional guns or butter issue is becoming the focal 
point of a renewed policy debate as the defense and welfare budgets come under 
intensified scrutiny during the 99th Congress. 
When turning to the affect of guns on the origins of the welfare state, 
however, the issues are far more complex than conventional wisdom would 
suggest.' Indeed, welfare state theorists, from Titmuss to Janowitz, without 
necessarily eschewing other theories of welfare state formation, acknowledge 
the importance of war as another major independent variable in the rise of the 
welfare state. As Janowitz states: 
For both nations  reat at Britain and the United States] the impact of 
World War I1 supplied the threshold events that brought the welfare state 
into being. In Great Britain, World War I1 had a more visible and a more 
dramatic consequence symbolically than in the United States. However, 
the procedures of national wartime mobilization for both countries--and 
in essence for all of the Western parliamentary democracies--created the 
essential structure of the welfare state. Writers with diverse 
assumptions, such as Otto Kirchheimer, R.M. Titmuss, Arthur Marwick, and 
Derek Fraser, concur in this con~lusion.~ 
As the aforementioned quote suggests, war is considered, by many 
researchers, to be a most important explanatory variable in understanding the 
origins of the welfare state. But in spite of the acknowledged importance of 
war, in the making of the welfare state, this issue has not received 
sufficient attention from students of social service policy formation. 
Indeed, at the time of this writing there is no exhaustive review that 
critically examines the theoretical and empirical studies that link war to the 
expansion, contraction, and continuity of welfare services. The purpose of 
this paper is to examine the ways in which war affected the rise of the early 
welfare state; to understand the underlying social scientific propositions 
linking war and welfare state formation; to examine war's influence on the 
modern system of social welfare; and to suggest areas for future research, all 
in a comparative historical context. What follows is an examination of 
progressive and social control perspectives linking war to welfare state 
format ion. 
The Progressive Perspective: From Guns to Butter 
The theories that follow are termed progressive theories.8 These 
theories generally maintain that a latent function of war is to speed 
progress.' Indeed, one benevolent function of war is the creation of the 
welfare state. These researchers argue that while war is undesirable and to 
be avoided, it does generate positive side effects such as the development of 
welfare policies and beneficial technologies that can be used by society at 
war's end. Figure 1 represents an ideal typical model of the progressive 
theory of war and the making of the welfare state. 
- Figure 1 - 
It must be recognized, however, that the notion of progressive theory is 
mainly a heuristic device. All of these theories are far more complex and 
subtle than the term "progressive" would indicate. 
The Napoleonic wars, the Poor Laws, and the British welfare state. Rose, 
while warning against an overly deterministic appraisal of these events, links 
the origins of the welfare state in Great Britain to the strains put on the 
poor law system by the wars with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France: 
As for Poor Law.history, that had surely been "done," as the hefty 
volumes of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's wotks...testified. ... In the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the social disruption caused 
by the long-drawn-out wars with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France 
placed intolerable strains upon the old parochial.system... The welfare 
state is seen as developing from an increasing reaction to the cruelties 
of the Poor Law ~ystem.~ 
Thus, according to Rose, the social life of 18th and early 19th century 
England was characterized by massive social disorganization caused by the wars 
with France. This, Rose contends, placed intolerable strains on the locally 
administered poor law system. This social disorganization led to a 
realization that the poor law system was cruel and unjust. This recognition 
eventually led to the modern British welfare state. 
Total war and the making of the welfare state. Where Rose examines the 
impact of war on the welfare systems of the 18th and 19th centuries, most 
other progressive researchers argue that the total wars of the 20th century 
had the greatest effect on the formation of the welfare state. Sleeman, for 
instance, argues that specific events during World War I and World War I1 led 
- to a new universalism in Great Britain, particularly in the area of housing. 
In fact, according to Sleeman, World War I and World War I1 created decisive 
changes in the behavior of public authorities that enhanced the development of 
the welfare state in Great Britain. As Sleeman explicates: 
It is not surprising that the second world war led to a profound 
rethinking and reorganization of Britain's social services. It has often 
been pointed out, notably by Lady Hicks and by Peacock and Wiseman, that 
public spending in' Britain has not increased steadily over the past 
century, but rather that there have been two big jumps accompanying the , 
two world wars. 
Sleeman continues: 
In the field of housing the first world war marked a decisive change in 
the role of the public authorities... 
During the war it became obvious that uncontrolled rise of rents would 
cause hardship, andso in 1915 rents of all but the largest houses were 
frozen. Rent control in one form or another has continued ever since.' 
So in 1915 rents of all houses, except those of the very wealthy, were 
frozen. Sleeman goes on to argue that through a process labeled "inspection, 
displacement, and concentration effects" the social distance, both economic 
and normative, between the wealthy and the poor was narrowed.' 
Sleanan's argument, therefore, is that World War I sensitized society to 
the plight of the poor. Sleeman implies that war created a type of societal 
consensus. One result of this consensus was an increased consciousness about 
housing payments. This led to the freezing of rents. The causal ordering 
implicit in Sleeman's argument is that societal norms changed state behavior. 
The recognition that increased suffering would result'without rent control 
occurred on a society-wide level before it was translated into welfare policy. 
There is no evidence in this argument that the interests of the state or 
public authorities are in any way different from those of the larger society. 
Wilensky, in a similar vein, maintains: 
The persuasive studies of Titmuss (1958), Briggs (1961), and others 
have taught us that World War I1 was oddly egalitarian. First, it 
brought full employment and capacity production, which meant a greater 
equalization of income. World War I1 saw blacks in America acquiring a 
foothold as semi-skilled workers in urban industry. Many were upgraded 
in literacy and skill. The bars of discrimination began to weaken. 
Other minority groups, such as women, were integrated into the economy as 
they never had been before. Labor never had it so good.l0 
War, according to Wilensky, brought full employment and greater equality for 
blacks, other minorities, and women. 
More specifically, Wilensky hypothesizes that "universalistic tendencies" 
resulted from both the United States' Civil War, and World War I. According 
to Wilensky: 
That big wars can foster equality is further evident in the American 
Civil War... 
Welfare developments of World War I in Britain (Hurwitz, 1949) and 
Germany (Feldman, 1966) con£ irm the general point: nations caught up in 
big wars, especially when they are losing battles and approaching total 
mobilization, find the political will to bring their official 
pronouncements and their public action closer together. . If equality is 
official doctrine, some of their people will be made more equal. 
Wilensky's argument is considerably more complex than Sleeman's model. 
First, Wilensky's argument is transhistorical. Wilensky, unlike Sleeman, 
argues that wars, regardless of when or where they occur, tend to create 
societal cohesion. It matters little, according to Wilensky, whether the war 
occurs in the 18th, 19th, or 20th century, whether the war occurs in Europe, 
the United States, or Asia." 
Likewise, Furniss and Tilton use the logic of the progressive perspective 
when hypothesizing about the effects of World War I1 on the welfare state. 
Furniss and Tilton hypothesize that World War 11 had a paradoxical effect upon 
the allied nations. In fact, two "countervailing forces" were at work. 
First, the war created the "aura and practice of social solidarity." In other 
words, people were joined in a cooperative effort in order to fight and win 
World War 11. This process brought people together and forged a normative 
consensus within society. But, at the same time, war brought strain and 
anomie. The war effort meant the disruption of traditional work and 
consumption patterns. Men used to civilian work became soldiers, women used 
to domestic work became laborers. The welfare state grew as a "dynamizing 
force," in order to bring groups back into 'society; a bridge between the 
countervailing forces of social disorganization and collective effort caused 
by society's participation in total war.12 This model is represented in 
Figure 2. 
- Figure 2 - 
Janowitz, on the other hand, contends that universalism is a key element 
in both the mobilization for total war, and the political arrangement known as 
the welfare state. Moreover, Janowitz argues that mobilization for total war 
can help create the societal and normative dimensions that are conducive to 
welfare state devel~pment~~ The Janowitz model is represented in Figure 3. 
- Figure 3 - 
Janowitz argues that this collective participation in World War 11, by 
both the military and civilian sectors, increased the sense of identity and 
assertiveness of low status groups. Furthermore, World War 11 strengthened 
the ideal of equality. Janowitz also recognizes the importance of other 
structural factors, as well as norms; the importance of state power upon 
society as well as society's impact upon the state. Specifically, Janowitz 
argues : 
The trends toward the welfare state that evolve during total war are 
not merely the result of stronger norms of equalitarianism and the 
stimulation of popular demands for social and economic betterment. In 
Great Britain, the morale of the home front was sustained not only by 
Winston Churchill's eloquent propaganda of national survival but also by 
explicit promises of postwar social reform... Thus it was the actual 
performance of the central government during the war that was crucial in 
the thrust toward a welfare state. The achievements of wartime . 
mobilization created cadres of administrators and administrative 
structures that could be adapted to large-scale societal innovation. 
This was in essence a kind of societal "breakthrough," iri both the United 
States and Great Britain.14 
In this way Janowitz expands upon the predominant progressive treatment of war 
and welfare. 
Although there are other progressive theories of war and the making of 
the welfare state, the works just reviewed capture the gist of these 
arguments. All of the theorists assert that war is a crucial factor in the 
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formation of the welfare state. Another group of researchers, however, argues 
that the progressive scientists have not been successful in proving that the 
development of the welfare state is a latent function of war. Instead, both 
welfare and warfare represent the interests of the rich and powerful. This 
perspective, that will now be examined, is termed the social control 
perspective. 
The Social Control Perspective 
The theories .that follow are termed social control theories.15 Many of 
these models have in common the notion that war and welfare result in the 
domination of the poor. This domination rests upon the monopoly of violence 
inherent in the state structure. The exercise of such power, or the threat to 
do so, is the foundation on which welfare policy is based. This argument 
stresses that the war-making apparatus exists not only to protect the state 
from foreign domination; but from internal threats as well. In this view 
welfare is, at best, a tenuous means of control. It is only effective if 
these policies are backed up by a violent coercive apparatus. In this sense 
the choice is not between guns or butter, but a recognition by the state of 
the need for both. 
War, social control, and the welfare state. The social control 
researchers, like their progressive counterparts, argue that total war effects 
welfare services. But, in contrast to the progressive arguments, the social 
control theorists argue that total war works against the interest of the 
working class and welfare recipients. 
Sorokin, Spencer, and Veblen present radically different hypotheses than 
progressive theories of total war and the making of the welfare state. As 
Sorokin contends: 
The essentials of Spencer's theory are: first, that war and militarism 
lead to an expansion of governmental control; second, to its 
centralization; third, to its despotism; fourth, to an increase of social 
stratification; and fifth, to a decrease of autonomy and self government 
of the people. In this way, war and militarism tend to transform a 
nation into an army, and an army into a nation.16 
To be sure, Spencer, in most of his major theoretical work, is the 
quintessential laissez-faire progressive theorist. But clearly, as Sorokin 
illustrates in this example, Spencer's theory of war and society is a social 
control theory. The argument that war sharpens social stratification, as 
Spencer's social control argument maintains, will be evaluated later. 
Veblen, in The Theory of Business Enterprise, argues that war, 
particularly total war, elicits autocratic rule. This rule results in state 
domination of society. This domination, instead of working to the advantage 
of welfare recipients, may actually cause the collapse of welfare benefits, 
and indeed even business enterprise, through the bankruptcy of the state.x7 
Moreover, Veblen, in direct opposition to progressive theory, argues: 
Warlike and patriotic preoccupations fortify the barbarian virtues of 
subordination and prescriptive authority. Habituation to a warlike, 
predatory scheme of life is the strongest disciplinary factor that can be 
brought to counteract the vulgarization of modern life wrought by 
peaceful industry and the machine process, and to rehabilitate the 
decaying sense of status and differential dignity. 
Veblen continues: 
In this direction, evidently, lies the hope of a corrective for "social 
unrest" and similar disorders of civilized life. There can, indeed, be 
no serious question but that a consistent return to the ancient virtues 
of allegiance, piety, servility, graded dignity, class prerogative, and 
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prescriptive authority would greatly conduce to popular content and to 
the facile management of affairs. Such is the promise held out by a 
strenuous national policy.18 
Veblen, therefore, argues against the progressive theory that war creates 
a new universalism. On the contrary,' Veblen asserts that total war is a 
desirable state of affairs, for a portion of the upper or leisure class, for 
exactly the opposite reasons: first, war works against universalism and 
democracy; second, war reduces social unrest; and finally, war preserves and 
heightens class distinctions. From Veblen's perspective, as indicated by the 
quotation, real democracy, universalism, and growing equality, work against 
upper class interests, and are clearly not elicited by total war. Moreover, 
total war, and military expenditures, may bankrupt the state, and hence work 
against welfare allocations. 
From butter to guns. Moreover, there is a different argument than the 
guns leads to butter, warfare leads to welfare, theory. Instead, from the 
viewpoint of other social control researchers, welfare can be used to develop 
healthy soldiers within.the poor population: butter can support guns. From 
this perspective the guns or butter distinction, therefore, is almost 
nonexistent. On the contrary, a large poorly fed population is a threat to 
national security. Since the poor and working classes are disproportionately 
represented in the infantry and the front lines the success or failure of the 
war effort might well depend on the health of the poor. In this view welfare 
is an investment in a nation's future. In this way the state legitimizes this 
manipulation as an imperative of national survival. 
According to this argument, welfare can sometimes be used as a form of 
manipulation of the poor; as a form of coercion in which the poor are given 
welfare benefits with the intent that, in return, the state will have well 
fed, healthy conscripts when needed. Welfare services, from the perspective 
of this social control argument, are given not to lessen social inequality. 
Instead, welfare services are given only to insure that the poor are minimally 
healthy. 
Venkatarangaiya argues that, due to the nature of modern war, butter 
proceeds guns." During the High Middle Ages war was the providence of the 
nobility. The very essence of feudalism, as Weber notes, is the domination of 
peasants by a military landed aristo~racy.'~ The means of war was in the 
hands of the few land owning patricians. The general population was excluded. 
from war. In the modern world, however, war can only be fought by armies 
numbering in the millions. There was an increasing need for recruits with 
higher physical, psychological and intellectual strength. Thus the well-being 
of the whole population was a military necessity. In particular, according to 
Venkatarangaiya, children,belonging to all classes were carefully looked after 
by the state, even in peacetime, so that recruits could be secured during a 
mobilization for war. Venkatarangaiya argues that a minimum standard of 
living became a crucial part of social and military policy." 
Fraser, moreover, maintains that the making of the welfare state in Great 
Britain was the result of a conscious effort by the state to improve the 
quality of the Imperial Army. Prior to the late 19th and early 20th century 
the superiority of the British army and navy was undisputed. Indeed, the 
British Empire continued to expand, and there was little reason to suspect 
that the British troops were not the world's finkst. The United States and 
Germany, of course, were beginning to challenge British hegemony. But 
Britain, at first, ignorkd these challenges, or at least was unable to prevent 
challenges, and 'became complacent about the actual condition of its armed 
forces. Fraser argues that a series of events brought a change in the way the 
British state viewed the quality of the ~mperial Army. This reevaluation of 
the Imperial Army, according to Fraser, also led to a reevaluation of British 
welfare services. The poor performance of the British soldiers in the Boer 
War, therefore, was blamed on the poor law policies of the laissez-faire 
state.= 
In sum, according to Fraser, the Boer War was the turning point in the 
way the British viewed the Imperial Army, and consequently the new poor law 
policies of the laissez-faire state. During the Boer War the Imperial Army 
performed miserably. This caused, according to Fraser, a general outrage in 
England. 2 
Even interest in meals for needy children, which dated back to the 1860s, 
was given its real stimulus at the beginning of the 20th century by the 
relatively poor performance of the British troops in the Boer War. Fraser 
argues that in a bizarre way, imperialism and social reform were allies.z4 
From Fraser's perspective, neither egalitarianism nor universalism was 
the major force behind the movement towards the welfare state in Great 
Britain. The main impetus was imperialism and the maintenance and expansion 
of the British world empire. Providing meals for needy children was one 
method by which healthy poor children could grow into healthy soldiers. 
Thus, in order to "sustain its empire in the future," a new generation of 
poor children, "tomorrow's Imperial Army," had to be "properly nourished." 
Thi-s argument links the origins of the welfare state to the Royal Commission's 
study of 1903 which found evidence of national deterioration in the health of 
the poor. This study, along with the growing outrage in England, led to a 
reevaluation of the new 19th century poor law policies.25 
Welfare was given, according to Fraser, in order to insure state 
security. Fraser emphasizes the relationship between external threats to the 
state and the making of the welfare state. This took the form of a massive 
centralization of welfare services. This centralization, which was reflected 
in a national standardization and coordination of welfare allocation, was 
dramatically different from the workhouse system of the new poor law laissez- 
f aire state. Workhouses were destroyed, welfare payments and other services 
for the poor were established. This centralization, standardization and 
coordination of welfare services insured that the poor were well nourished and 
hence suitable fighting material for the maintenance and expansion of the 
British Empire. 
Thus Fraser argue that the greatest single stimulus to the enlargement of 
the welfare state was national defense. This process intensified at the 
beginning of World War I.. Fraser argues that the practical needs of the 
national efficiency were replaced by an even greater amount of state 
intervention. This intervention became so intensive that the Manchester 
Guardian called this wartime social structure "war socialism." As national 
defense changed to international war, the state enlarged and government 
intervention increased.=' 
Guns and Butter 
In the theory that follows structural domination entails the growth of 
the administrative apparatus of war: internal armies, militia, officer corp, 
police force, and standing army. This argument stresses that welfare is only 
a means the state uses to control the masses and promote social order. The 
administrative apparatus of war  must always be available to crush protest if 
welfare fails to maintain social order. Moreover, if the police are 
ineffective in maintaining social order the state must be able to call upon 
other, more powerful, forms of coercion, such as a national guard or militia. 
If all else fails the state must rely upon its regular army to restore social 
14 . 
order. Even when protest is nonexistent they must be prepared to crush 
uprisings should they occur. This social control perspective, therefore, 
stresses that the instruments of war must be in place before a stable welfare 
state can emerge. 
Dorwart's work can be used to clarify the nature of the relationship 
between the apparatus of war and the making of the welfare state. For 
Dorwart: "Fundamental to any welfare state is police power, the element of 
force or compulsion, the authority inherent in the office of government."a7 
Thus the policies of the "Prussian Welfare State" were based upon 
political expediency stemming from a central problem. The Hobbesian state, as 
Dorwart conceives of it, exists in a context of threat. To exist a state must 
establish and maintain its autonomy, freeing itself form both external and 
internal threat. The external threats refer to hostile nations; the internal 
threat refers to potential revolutionary sections of the population, most 
probably, according to this view, the underclasses. 
Thus, within'the Hobbesian welfare state, according to Dorwart, the 
general welfare was the apparent goal; but the general welfare, in this 
Prussian welfare state, was contingent upon the state's ability to establish, 
through the formation of internal and external oriented armies, both internal 
and international security. Only when this security was achieved, in 
Dorwart's view, could the state make progress towards welfare. 
Dorwart 's argument, simply stated, is that both welfare and internal 
security forces are two means of coercion in which the state, under the guise 
of welfare, regulates the activities of its citizens. Oorwart distinguishes 
between two goals of the Prussian welfare state: 1) the regulation of 
activities for the welfare of the individual, and 2) the regulation of 
activities of its citizens for the common good. Unfortunately, according to 
Dorwart, citizens and individuals do not always agree with the state as to 
what constitutes the common good, nor do they always agree with the state as 
to what constitutes the welfare of the individual. Internal security forces, 
according to Dorwart, insure, even if the disagreements between the state and 
its citizens erupt into violence, that the state has the final say.=' 
In sum Dorwart argues that this Hobbesian regulative welfare state used 
both guns and butter in order to coerce the populace into obedience. Dorwart 
argues that police power is the fundamental ingredient in the formation of the 
welfare state. The power of compulsion is the power of the welfare state. 
The ability to order the lives of the poor not only rests upon the welfare 
payments or services, but, at least in the 15th and 16th century in the area 
that is now Germany, on guns." 
In a similar vein, Furniss and Tilton, in opposition to their earlier 
progressive stance, argue that war can increase welfare e~penditures.~~ Their 
hypothesis, however, is based upon pre-welfare state events. Furniss and 
Tilton contend that the Napoleonic War had a significant impact upon poor 
relief. They suggest that this war had a dual impact upon welfare allocations 
in England. First, there was a need for social peace during a time of intense 
national crisis. Social unrest against the state at home would tax the 
crown's ability to wage war against France. It was reasoned that welfare 
would subdue the masses and insure that England would only fight a war on one 
front. The English state would only have to deal with France; not with 
domestic enemies as well. Purniss and Tilton, in summary, argue (see Figure 
4) that international political crises, and domestic situations, are both 
causally linked to the formation of welfare policies. 
- Figure 4 - 
Baran and Sweezy hypothesize, from a Marxist position, that the crisis of 
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capitalism effects both military and welfare state expenditures. The core 
idea behind Baran and Sweezy's theory is that the modern capitalist economy, 
dominated by a corporate monopolistic oligarchy, tends to generate an 
" v g e a b l e  surplus." This surplus is, in fact, the major problem facing 
capital.'l This "unmanageable surplus" creates a crisis within the capitalist 
ec'onomy. This crisis is caused, ironically, by the very success of the 
expropriation process. 
A solution to this crisis, from Baran and Sweezy's position, entails some 
form of redistribution in order to end the economic stagnation caused by this 
surplus. But redistribution, particularly in the form of welfare, is against 
the "entrenched interests of capital." Indeed, the idea of economic 
redistribution, especially the idea of giving the poor a share of this 
surplus, is alien to the whole profit maximizing system of capitalism. 
Redistribution in the form of defense expenditures, however, is far more 
in line with capitalist interests than redistribution to the poor. To be 
sure, defense spending, Baran and Sweezy argue, is also wasteful. 
Nevertheless, defense spending has at least two benefits: 1) the expansion of 
a new profit making armament industry, and 2)  the potential for defense and 
expansion of business interests through force, both at home and abroad. Thus 
in choosing between guns and butter, from Baran and Sweezy's argument, the 
capitalist will choose guns. 
O'Connor, another Marxist researcher, is in agreement with Baran and 
Sweezy in arguing that the roots of American militarism can be "traced 
directly to the tendency for the monopoly section to generate surplus 
capital ." But, in contrast to Baran and Sweezy, OIConnor argues that the 
interests of monopoly capital are not entrenched in the way Baran and Sweezy's 
thesis would predict. Instead, O'Connor argues that it is in the interest of 
capital to have both defense and welfare spending.32 
Specifically, O'Connor argues that state expenditures serve two purposes. 
The first purpose is to stabilize and expand the interests of monopoly 
capital. O'Connor calls this the "accumulation" function of the state. 
Moreover, O'Connor argues that welfare, by encouraging the pacification of the 
unemployed, also serves a function for monopoly capital. It seems unlikely, 
from O'Connorls perspective, that the poor will launch a revolutionary 
movement against the state as long as the welfare state provides them with 
food and shelter. O'Connor calls this the "legitimation" function of the 
state. Finally, welfare payments, by giving the poor money to spend in the 
marketplace, helps to expand consumer demand. 
O'Connor reasons that the development of massive expenditures for both 
welfare and warfare represents the making of a new type of state: the 
warfare-welfare state (O'Connor, 1973: 151). O'Connor predicts, however, that 
the welfare-warfare state will not ease. the contradictions that confront the 
. capitalist system. On the contrary, O'Connor predicts that defense and 
welfare expenditures will continue to soar and thus exacerbate the fiscal 
crisis of the state. The capitalists may allay this crisis, at least 
temporarily, by the formation of what O'Connor terms a social-industrial 
complex. But even this formation will only postpone, not prevent, the 
collapse of the capitalist system. In sum, from O'Connorls perspective, the 
only solution to the fiscal crisis is socialism.J3 
Likewise, Melman argues that the welfare state's failure to end the Great 
Depression led to a warfare state: a state dominated by a permanent war 
economy. The New Deal l d  to a decrease in unemployment. But even at the eve 
of World War 11, Melman argues, millions were unemployed. World War I1 
brought an end to the crisis of capitalism by ending the unemployment problem. 
This structure, in keeping with Melman's discussion, led to a permanent war 
economy that resembles O'Connor's description of the welfare-warfare state." 
Stavrianos, also arguing from a social control perspective, maintains 
that total war accelerated the growth of the welfare state in order to 
mitigate the organizationally based conflict between labor and business. 
Although Stavrianos is not precise about the causal order of his explanation, 
war, according to Stavrianos, accelerated the change from the laissez-faire 
state, or the "night-watchman state" of.the 19th century, to the modern . 
welfare state. The acceleration theme of this social control argument is 
similar to the progressive argument that total war was a catalyst hastening 
the growth of the welfare state." 
But this social control argument, by emphasizing the way that war 
accelerated the growth of the welfare state, which acted as a buffer in the 
conflict between business and labor, is also diametrically opposed to the 
progressive perspective. The welfare state, according to the logic of 
Stavrianos' argument, froze existing class arrangements. Total war acted to 
promote the growth of the welfare state, and implicitly, may have spared the 
capitalist system from a potentially revolutionary situation. To be sure, 
again drawing inferences from Stavrianos' argument, workers were allowed to 
pressure big business, but only within the parameters set by the growing 
welfare state. 
In sum, all of the social control theories reviewed suggest that war does 
not lead to progressive welfare reform. What often appears to be progress, 
according to social control researchers, is in reality some form of cajoling, 
manipulation, or outright repression of the poor. But both the social control 
and progressive perspectives agree that war, in one way or another, has 
influenced the making and development of the welfare state. What follows is a 
discussion and critique of these perspectives and the theories just reviewed. 
Discussion 
In this section both the progressive and social control perspectives will 
be compared and criticized. This critique will pay particular attention to 
the effects of world war on the formation of welfare policy in the 20th 
century. This, of course, is a period of critical importance for both 
perspectives and hence is an ideal test case for assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of each paradigm. 
The studies just reviewed, from both the progressive and social control 
perspectives, display two qualities: 1) they are highly theoretical; and 2) 
there is little systematic evidence presented to substantiate the claims made 
by these perspectives. Obviously, this makes it difficult to settle the 
dispute between these two paradigms because it is hard to discern, from the 
almost anecdotal evidence presented in these studies, which perspective is 
accurate. This lack of precise research may result in what could be called a 
utopian, or evolutionary, bias within the progressive perspective, and a 
dystopian, or de-evolutionary bias within the social control perspective.J' 
An initial criticism of both perspectives is that these schools may 
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wersimplify the role war played in the origins of the welfare state. 
Similarly, the argument that war is an independent variable in the rise of the 
welfare state applies to many, but not all, of the major western welfare 
states. This argument, that war elicited welfare state formation, works for 
Edwardian Great Britain, but it is less clear how this argument applies to the 
United States. In the United States the welfare state emerged during the 
depths of the Great Depression. Moreover, in the United States example, World 
War I probably had some centralizing effects, but the Untied States remained a 
laissez-faire state until the 1930s. This, of course, was before World War 11 
in the 1940s. Likewise the isolationist policies of the U.S. during the 1930s 
is evidence against any argument that the New Deal was an wert mobilization 
for war. The idea that the New Deal was a cwert mobilization, however, has 
never been researched. In sum, war does not create all welfare states. 
By the logic of the progressive arguments concerning the origins of the 
welfare state, one would predict a greater integration of minorities, women, 
and some decrease in social stratification during the war. This follows from 
the progressive argument that war elicits increased equality and social 
cohesion which in turn leads to welfare state expansion. This model is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
This means that equality, and social togetherness should increase during 
the war effort. This necessarily follows if the progressive causal chain, as 
indicated in Figure 1, is in fact valid. 
In opposition to the progressive position, the social control perspective 
researchers maintain that war sharpens class and status group conflict; that 
war leads not to consensus but to increased structural domination, class 
conflict, and ineq~ality.'~ The welfare state, according to the social 
control argument, is affected in different ways by this sharpened inequality. 
In short, the social control argument is that during war the poor and the 
working classes follow the desires of the state and/or capital. War, in other 
words, tightens the control of the working class. According to the logic of 
the social control argument, if a state is a welfare state at the time of war 
it becomes more coercive as war progresses. In fact, war transforms the 
welfare state into what Veblen describes as a neo-dynastic system in which the 
state and the military dominate society. As Sorokin argues, a nation becomes 
an army and an army becomes a nation. Lasswell calls this form of state a 
garrison state." 
The evidence for the progressive argument is the strongest when examining 
women's participation in the wartime work force. Between 1940 and 1945 the 
number of women in the work force rose from 12 million to 16.5 million. This 
was a change from 25.5 percent of the labor force to 36 percent, a change of 
over ten percent. Thus if women's. employment is seen as evidence of a growing 
egalitarianism, this data strengthens the progressive argument..J9 
The progressive perspective, therefore, is quite right in arguing that 
total war brought some minorities, particularly women, into defense industries 
in unprecedented numbers. Jobs normally reserved for men were being performed 
by women. Women participated in the construction of tanks, ships and aircraft 
as well as riveting these weapons. By the same token other so called male 
endeavors were also being done by women.40 
Moreover, it could be argued that since women's participation in the 
labor force never returned to postwar levels, a change in the norms of society 
caused by the war effort must have occurred. Indeed, about two-thirds of the 
women who did war work remained in the labor force. Thus the percentage of 
women in the labor force settled at about 29 percent. This, however, was only 
an increase of about 3.5 percent over the prewar years. Nevertheless,. as the 
progressive perspective predicted, this may have represented a change in 
societal norms.41 
But there is also evidence, more in line with the social control 
argument, that women were grossly underpaid during the war. Official 
government policy, as announced by the War Labor Board on November 25, 1942, 
favored equal pay for women. Unfortunately, this policy was rarely 
implemented. Employers waded this policy. In fact, earnings among women 
production workers remained, on the average, about 40 percent below the 
salaries of men.4a 
Moreover, at the end of World War I1 over two million women lost their 
jobs in order to make these jobs available to the returning male soldiers. 
This may indicate that women's participation in the work force during the war 
did not lead to permanent normative changes. If massive and permanent 
normative changes towards women had actually occurred then, more than likely, 
these women would not have been fired. 
Marwick's evidence suggests, although the widence is far from 
conclusive, that women's participation in war did not reflect a fundamental 
change in norms; it probably represented a solution to a structural problem of 
labor shortage due to the large number of males shipped overseas. Marwick's 
evidence weakens the progressive causal chain linking war, equality, and 
welfare. Since the middle link of this progressive model, equality, is weak 
it is possible that this model may be inaccurate. Nevertheless, this 
widence, once again, is far from conclusive. 
A social control interpretation would follow along more materialistic 
lines. The apparent lessening of inequality was only an illusion. The 
structural demands of the war effort forced women into the work force. With 
most males overseas, the only hope for victory was for women to enter the 
workplace. According to the social control perspective, after the war the 
structural demands for women in the work force lessened. Thus millions of 
women were fired. The social control perspective researchers, however, would 
argue that some women were able to mobilize sufficient resources to keep their 
jobs. This may have happened in at least two ways. Women may have accepted 
demotions to less challenging work. Moreover, social control theorists would 
argue that some women were able to form coalitions in order to protect their 
jobs upon the termination of the war. Either way, the social control 
perspective theorists would argue the fact that women's employment never 
returned to prewar levels reflected the tenacity of women, not he growth of a 
consensus. Thus the social control perspective would follow a more 
materialistic argument.43 
Turning to the effects of war on the integration of blacks into society, 
the progressive argument appears to be inaccurate. It would be predicted, by 
the progressive arguments just reviewed, that war should lessen inequality 
and, integrate blacks back into society. Thus war would have a positive 
effect on black participation in the United States. 
According to Polenberg, blacks were not as well integrated into society 
as progressive theory would predict. Although the United States did not enter 
World War I1 until after Pearl Harbor, industrial participation started 
earlier. Polenberg maintains that as late as 1940 blacks suffered from high 
unemployment and economic insecurity. In fact, during 1940 blacks lived with 
more insecurity than most whites had known during the Depression. The 
unemployment rate for blacks at the beginning of 1941 was 20 percent. The 
jobs that blacks could get usually involved hot, dirty work and offered little 
security or economic rewards. Moreover, there were few chances for upward 
mobility in these jobs.44 
In 1940, of 100,000 persons employed by the aircraft industry only 240 
were blacks. Most of these blacks were janitors. Turning to the electrical 
machinery industry, another crucial part of the defense sector, less than one 
percent of these workers were black; in the rubber industry less than 3 
percent were black. Polenberg argues that as the defense industry grew, 
whites, not blacks, were given the jobs. To be sure, some jobs did open up 
for blacks because of the war effort. In particuiar, dangerous infantry work 
went to blacks. Moreover, as Polenberg argues, on the home front blacks took 
over those jobs vacated by the poor whites such as hotel bellhops, short order 
cooks, elevator operators, and car parkers at garages.d5 
In fact, during the early days of the war effort, the proportion of 
blacks in manufacturing was less than the proportion of blacks working in 
manufacturing during the Great Depression. Almost two out of wery three 
blacks, compared to one out of five blacks, were domestics, unskilled 
agricultural workers, industrial laborers, or in low status service jobs. 
Moreover, blacks also experienced discrimination in government employment. 
The few blacks that were able to get government jobs were hired as janitors 
rather than skilled workers or white collar workers.de 
Therefore, it appears, drawing from Polenberg's data, that blacks were 
not experiencing the benefits of any new universalism, in spite of the 'fact 
that by 1941 U.S. industry was booming -as it had not boomed since the 1920s. 
During the early 1940s more cars were being built than w e r  before. The War 
Production Board called this process,a new Industrial Revolution. The 
production that normally took months and years was condensed into days. 
Despite these developments, blacks did not seem to reap large benefits from 
this large collective effort. 
Finally, contrary to the progressive perspective's contention that war 
creates solidarity, the World War I1 era was actually marked by intense racial 
conflict. In fact, during the week of June 20, 1943, more than thirty-four 
people died and more than one thousand others were wounded during a race riot 
in Detroit. This riot was more destructive than any previous similar conflict 
in American history. A riot of such intensity, occurring during a world war, 
is widence against solidarity theory.d7 
It might be argued, however, that the groups involved in this riot were 
suffering from anomie. War, according to this progressive argument, created 
rapid social change which led to a state of normlessness within these groups. 
Recent research, from what is called the resource mobilization perspective, 
however, provides evidence against this theory. Groups involved in most forms 
of collective action, from the point of view of the resource mobilization 
perspective, are usually expressing real interests and grievances. Thus the 
groups involved in this riot, from the standpoint of the resource mobilization 
perspective, were, in all probability, not just responding irrationally due to 
a breakdown in norms, but were, in fact, expressing real grievances.4' 
Moreover, anti-Semitism, as well as racial conflict, increased during 
World War 11. This is reflected in various opinion polls taken at this time. 
This increase in anti-Semitism is contrary to the predictions of solidarity 
hyp~theses.~' 
Furthermore, many new anti-Semitic groups formed during the war years. 
'One such group, the Gentile Cooperative Association, was formed in Chicago. 
The purpose of this association was to "halt growing Jewish power." An 
increase in anti-Semitic disturbances also occurred during the war. For 
instance, in the Boston suburbs of Roxbury and Dorchester, gangs of teenagers 
desecrated synagogues, smashed store windows of Jewish shop-owners, and fought 
with Jewish youth in the streets. Thus, anti-Semitism appears to have 
increased during the war.so 
There is evidence to suggest that other segments of the population during 
World War I1 suffered increased inequality within the United States. One 
particular group, the Japanese-Americans, wen experienced direct oppression 
during the first part of World War 11. The well-known case of the evacuation 
of Japanese-Americans from the west coast into concentration camps fits into 
the social control model, but not readily into the progressive model of war 
and the making of the welfare state. The imprisonment of Japanese-Americans 
resembles the process of social control that is predicted by the social 
control perspective. Moreover, this evacuation was facilitated by a number of 
New Deal welfare agencies." Thus it appears, at least for this event, that 
the social control explanation that the welfare state is an apparatus for 
social control, is more viable than the progressive explanation that the 
welfare state increases equality. It might be argued that this event was the 
result of anomie brought about by the bombing of Pearl Harbor. But the fact 
that this evacuation was carried out by the New Deal agencies of the welfare 
state weakens this argument. By the reasoning of the progressive perspective, 
the Japanese-Americans should have been integrated into society by the welfare 
state, not imprisoned under the guidance of these agencies. 
This evidence also conforms to Veblen's, Sorokin's, and Spencer's 
argument that social control by the state increases during war." Dorwart's 
argument about the interrelationship between welfare and coercion is also 
thrown into bold relief by this last example. Nevertheless, this issue 
 require,^ more systematic research before any firm conclusions can be 
reached. a 
The empirical evidence just reviewed weakens the assertions of the 
progressive school and lends support to the social control arguments. Anti- 
Sanitism, as these social control theorists hypothesized, appears to have 
increased during the war. Moreover, racial tensions, from the evidence 
reviewed, appear to have increased also during World War 11. To be sure, the 
job-prospects for blacks appear to have increased during the war; but these 
new jobs, comparatively speaking, were still the lower status jobs. The job 
opportunities for women increased; but women were underpaid and millions of 
women were fired after the war. Briefly, there is little evidence to suggest 
that a new universalism based upon normative change was formed during World 
War 11. Instead, intense nationalism may have formed during the war. It 
appears this intense nationalism may have exacerbated differences between 
class and status groups rather than eased group conflict. Secondly, 
conscription, housing shortages, food rationing, new demands on labor and 
other austerities that occurred during the war, may also have highlighted 
class, status, and ethnic differences. 
This discussion, regarding nationalism and inequality, is of course 
highly speculative. More research is needed in order to determine the exact 
relationship between nationalism, warfare and welfare policies. 
The empirical evidence just reviewed, however, does not prove the social 
control assertion that inequality increased during the war; nor does it prove 
that war transforms the welfare state into a garrison state nor a neo-dynastic 
state.&' What the widence does suggest, however, is that this may be the 
case. Moreover, it appears there are serious conceptual and empirical 
problems with the progressive model. Indeed, as noted earlier, this evidence 
weakens the causal argument of the progressive perspective. If war did not 
create a new universalism, it is doubtful that this could be responsible for 
the welfare boom at the end of the war. Systhtic research is needed, 
however, before these issues can be totally resolved. 
Conclusion 
War has been shown to be a most important variable in the rise of the 
welfare state. It appears from the review of this literature that in-depth 
case studies and/or comparative analyses, along with a more precise 
measurement of the variables involved, would lead to a greater understanding 
of the relationship between war and the making of the welfare state. 
Different nations could be examined in order to determine if the key variables 
involved in the origins of welfare states apply to just a few or to many such 
states in western society. 
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In summary, the specific suggestions regarding future research on war and 
the making of the welfare state are threefold: 1) the development of new 
theories that incorporate multiple independent variables; 2) the use of more 
precise measurement techniques; and 3) the use of historical comparative 
analysis and intensive case studies in order to test and generate more 
accurate theories of war and the making of the welfare state. From the social 
control perspective studies of three state structures, the laissez-faire 
state, the welfare state, and the garrison state, may help researchers 
understand whose interests the state serves. From the progressive perspective 
these suggestions may help untangle the relationship between norms, welfare, 
bureaucratization and war. Finally, it is hoped these recommendations will 
lead to more tests of the social control and progressive perspectives of war 
and the making.of the welfare state. 
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